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Relation of Game Theory to Economic History and Marginalism 
M. Ulric Killion1 
Abstract 
The Article presents a brief survey of economic history, by emphasizing the earlier 
history of neo-classical economic theory and the economic theory of marginal utility. The 
Articles does so, by exploring the relation of game theory or the strategic game to 
developments in the field or science of economics, especially developments in economic 
thought occurring during the earlier marginal revolution or the economic history of 
marginalism. By doing so, the Article intends to show, though most attribute the new 
science of modern game theory to the field of mathematics, that the influence of 
corresponding or correlating developments in the field, science or discipline of 
economics was equally influential in the birth of game theory or the strategic game. 
 
1. Introduction 
The roots or lying at the core of what now generally hails as the discipline or science of 
game theory or the strategic game, though some theorists, scholars, and practitioners 
might disagree when applying the tools of game theory to economic problems (Ghoniem 
and Reda, 2008), are earlier important developments in both classical economics and neo-
classical economic theory. Notwithstanding a correlating history of mathematics, from 
the Egyptian or Babylonian mathematics (i.e., the Talmud results) (Aumann, 1985), to 
Greek or Hellenistic mathematics, and then to modern mathematics (Sir Heath, 1963), it 
is a history of economic theory that also associates or correlates with the economic 
history of marginalism or the economic theory of marginal utility.  
In the context of (both earlier forms or origins and modern) game theory, the earlier 
developments in economic theory are better understood in the context of a before and 
after period that associate with the earlier 1944 advancements made by the Austrian 
economist Oskar Morgenstern and the mathematician John von Neumann (Morgenstern 
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and Neumann, 1944). In 1944, Morgenstern, working with von Neumann, establishes the 
mathematical field of what hails as modern game theory (Morgenstern and Neumann, 
1944). The classical work of Morgenstern and Neumann, in their Theory of Games and 
Economics Behavior, still serves as the foundation of modern game theory, which is the 
expected utility hypothesis or the Neumann-Morgenstern utility.  
Notwithstanding expounding a two-person zero sum theory and expanding game 
theory in their notion of a cooperative game (i.e., with transferable utility), such as the 
coalitional form and its Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, what distinguishes the work of 
Morgenstern and Neumann (1944) is their account of axiomatic utility theory, which 
subsequently experiences wide acceptance in the field of economics. More importantly, 
in the field of economics, they proved that any normal preference relation over a finite set 
of states is reducible to an expected utility. Morgenstern and Neumann (1944), when 
explicating their classic theory of games, eventually presented what may theorists, 
scholars, and economists hail as the first axiomatization of the expected utility model that 
receives widespread attention, which mostly, though not universally, postulates to be 
bounded functions of wealth. Both Karl Menger (1934) and his The Role of Uncertainty 
in Economics (Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Wertlehre, and Frank Ramsey, 1931) 
and his work Truth and probability, also, though only partially, predate the treatment of 
utility by Morgenstern and Neumann (1944).  
Before 1944, or before the announcement of the expected-utility hypothesis or the 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility, there are the early eighteenth century theories of Daniel 
Bernoulli (1954) and Nicolas Bernoulli (1982). There is the theory of Daniel Bernoulli 
(1954: 22-36), whom, in 1738, made an earlier statement of the same or similar 
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hypothesis as a means of resolving what is referred as the St. Petersburg paradox, which 
is an economics—paradox in probability theory and decision theory. Many theorists, 
scholars, and economists consider the St. Petersburg paradox as arguably predating the 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility.  
The St. Petersburg paradox, which results from an irrational application of probability 
mathematics, generally involves a bet with an exponentially increasing payoff. As for the 
namesake of St. Petersburg paradox, the name or phrasing comes from Daniel Bernoulli’s 
(1982) earlier statement of the problem or paradox in his Commentaries of the Imperial 
Academy of Science of Saint Petersburg (Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis, 
Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, 1738).  
Many theorists, scholars, and economists also consider Daniel Bernoulli’s (1954) 
statement of the problem as, actually, being earlier predated by a statement of the same 
problem by Daniel Bernoulli’s cousin, who was Nicolas Bernoulli (1999). This statement 
is attributable to an earlier letter that Nicolas Bernoulli’s (1999) sent to Pierre Raymond 
de Montmort.  It is in the September 9, 1713 correspondence of Nicola Bernoulli that 
Nicola Bernoulli is said to have set forth an earlier form of the classical St. Petersburg 
paradox. The September 9, 1713 of Nicola Bernoulli (1999), in important part, reads as 
follows.  
Fourth Problem. A promises to give a coin to B, if with an ordinary die he 
achieves 6 points on the first throw, two coins if he achieves 6 on the 
second throw, 3 coins if he achieves this point on the third throw, 4 coins 
if he achieves it on the fourth and thus it follows; one asks what is the 
expectation of B?  
 
Fifth Problem. One asks the same thing if A promises to B to give him 
some coins in this progression 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 etc. or 1, 3, 9, 27 etc. or 1, 4, 9, 
16, 25 etc. or 1, 8, 27, 64 in stead of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc. as beforehand. 
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Although for the most part these problems are not difficult, you will find 
however something most curious. 
 
There is also the November 13, 1713 letter of James Waldegrave that was sent to 
Pierre-Remond de Montmort, who, in turn, wrote a letter to Nicolas Bernoulli (Kuhn, 
1968). In his November 13, 1713 letter to Montmort, Waldegrave described a two-person 
version of the card game known as le Her. This is the same game that Arthur T. 
Benjamin and A.J. Goldman (2002) later employed when presenting their complete 
solution to le Her, by an analysis exploiting “convexity properties in the payoff matrix,” 
thereby “allowing this discrete to be resolved by continuous methods.”  
According to Benjamin and Goldman (2002), they analyzed a modern variant of le 
Her, which is a card-game enjoying a long history in mathematical literature. In terms of 
the mathematical history of the game, although they acknowledged that the authentic 
two-player 52-card-game of le Her is reportedly solved by Dresher (1951), though with 
an earlier anticipation of a solution by R. A. Fisher (1934). Todhunder (1949), as 
explained by Benjamin and Goldman (2002), described the efforts of Nicolas Bernoulli 
when attempting a solution, and the efforts of Montmort, though both of their efforts 
suffered from the critical lack of a mixed strategy concept.  
Nonetheless, in his November 13, 1713-letter to Nicola Bernoulli, Montmort 
described Waldegrave’s solution, which is an earlier form of what is known as the 
minimax mixed strategy equilibrium (Kuhn, 1968). However, Montmont failed to 
mention to Nicola Bernoulli that he had not made an extension of his results to other 
games, while also expression his concern that a mixed strategy “does not seem to be in 
the usual play” of games of chance (Kuhn, 1968). Moreover, some theorists, scholars, 
historians, and economists even go as far as to attribute the principle of marginal utility to 
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Gabriel Cramer (1738) and his earlier attempt to solve the classical St. Petersburg 
paradox in a 1738 letter to Nicolas Bernoulli. 
In modern parlance, the concept of a mixed strategy equilibrium associates with a 
mixed strategy, which refers to a probability distribution that one uses to randomly 
choose among available actions for avoiding being predictable; whereas, the mixed 
strategy equilibrium specifically refers to what each player in a game uses, or colloquially 
speaking, the strategy that is best for him/her against strategies of other players. As such, 
in various interactions, situations or experiences, a player’s success is contingent on 
his/her actions remaining unpredictable (i.e., competitive sports; games of chance). For 
this reason, in terms of the history of the strategic game, many associate John von 
Neumann’s (1928) earlier (i.e., before 1944) theoretization, in his Zur Theorie der 
Gesellschaftsspiele (On the Theory of Parlor Games), of the strategic game or situations, 
actually, with the birth of game theory. This is because many associate von Neumann 
with the explication of the concept of the mixed strategy (i.e., random acts occurring in 
some binominal process).   
In other words, in all zero sum two-person games, when each player’s set of available 
strategies is finite there must be a value (i.e., security level) for each player, while each 
player must also have at least one minimax strategy, which is a strategy that assures the 
player that no matter how his opponent plays, he/she will achieve at least his/her security 
level for the particular game, in expected value terms. A problematic is that in many 
games, admittedly, the minimax strategies are often pure strategies, thus, some games 
require no mixing strategies, while other games do. 
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For this reason, John Nash’s (1950a; 1950b) later theoretizations are distinguishable. 
This is because Nash (1950a; 1950b) developed the concept of equilibrium in games, 
including his famous non-zero-sum games and games with arbitrary numbers of players. 
His equilibrium represents a combination of strategies, with a singular strategy for a 
singular players, thereby manifesting the concept that each player’s strategy is the best 
strategy for his/her against the strategies of the other players; thereby, ultimately, 
presenting the concept of a sustainable combination of strategies, or simply, an 
equilibrium manifesting that a player is without incentive to change his/her strategy. As 
for the mixed strategy equilibrium in this context, as each player employs a mixed 
strategy, this game with only an equilibria that is mixed represents a mixed strategy 
equilibrium game. This is because in the two-person zero-sum game, there exists an 
equivalence between the minimax and equilibrium. This is due to being equilibrium for 
each player to employ a minimax strategy, while equilibrium is only capable of 
comprising minimax strategies (Nash, 1950a; 1950b; 1953). There are also the modern 
translations or interpretations of mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis 
(Shachat, 2002; Crawford, 1990; Harsanyi, 1973). 
Then there are the subsequent developments, though predating the Neumann-
Morgenstern utility, during the Hicks-Allen “ordinal revolution” of the 1930’s, which are 
developments in the science of economics owing to the works of Sir John Richard Hicks 
and Sir Roy George Douglas Allen (Samuelson, 1974: 1255-1289). As observed by the 
Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, in his classical treatise on economics in Human 
Action: A Treatise on Economics (Nationalökonomie: Theorie Des Handelns und 
Wirthschaftens, 1940; English version, 1949), “Action sorts and grades; originally it 
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knows only ordinal numbers, not cardinal numbers. But the external world to which 
acting man must adjust his conduct is a world of quantitative determinateness” (Mises, 
1940: 119-127). Significance attaches to the ordinal revolution because it revives the idea 
of cardinal utility in economic theory, in particular, in choice theory.  
The expected value of the game, or Bernoulli’s expected utility hypothesis, generally 
is the sum of the expected payoffs of all the consequences ensuing from the game. What 
is important is the historical progression from Bernoulli’s expected utility hypothesis, to 
the Hick-Allen ordinal revolution, to the Neumann-Morgenstern utility. The influence of 
neoclassicism is obvious, as these and other earlier developments in the fields of 
economics and mathematics, ultimately influence the development of modern game 
theory. As Seen (2000: 271-292) observed and demonstrates in his study entitled 
“Mathematics and the social sciences at the time of the modern beginnings of the social 
sciences” (2000), many of the earlier developers of the new science of society did employ 
mathematics in earlier social thought, from the earliest use of the term le science sociale 
(the social sciences); during the 1700s, to the era of modern social sciences, including the 
discipline or science of modern game theory. 
2. The Marginalist Revolution 
 
The approach of the earlier economists, such as Carl Menger, to marginal utility, actually, 
though not so obvious to many, comprises a not so well known psychological approach, 
or the approach of the Psychological School. The approach of the Psychological School 
refers to these earlier proponents by what John Hobson earlier coins as marginalism and 
marginalists, which are only new nomenclatures serving as alternative means of 
describing neoclassical economic theory. There are also the second-generation 
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marginalists that would later crystallize both marginalism and neoclassical economic 
theory. The second-generation marginalists comprise economists such as Philip Henry 
Wicksteed, William Smart, Alfred Marshall, Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich 
von Wieser, Vilfredo Pareto, Herbert Joseph Davenport, Frank A. Fetter, and many 
others that would join the second phase of the marginal revolution. This school of 
thought characterizes empirical analysis or empiricism and its scientific method (Howey, 
1973: 15-36).  
Before 1879, the theory of marginal utility has two schools of thought. First, there is 
value-use theory. Second, there is the theory of objective value, such as the British 
classicists and their “labor value.” The history of the theory of marginal utility from 
Aristotle (384–322 BC) to the Prussian economist Hermann Heinrich Gossen (Kauder, 
1953; Weinberger, Ohlin, 1926; Bernoulli, 1896) demonstrates that theorists of the 
objective value had earlier discovered the theory of marginal utility. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was obvious to Italian and French 
economists that the interplay between utility and scarcity explains the value of consumer 
goods, money, and wages. While Robert Jacques Turgot (Baron de l'Aulne) theorizes a 
price theory, though at a later date, which is similar to that of Johan Gustaf Knut Wicksell, 
it is Daniel Bernoulli, in his Versuch einer neuen Theorie der Wertbestimmung von 
Glucksfallen (published 1896), whom presented a mathematical analysis of marginal 
utility. 
What is interesting in terms of understanding the principle of marginal utility, 
economic theory, neoclassicism, including Austrian economics such as that of Carl 
Menger, is a hidden psychological approach that lies beneath its veil. For instance, there 
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is Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1967) and his classical statement of the general theory of 
marginal utility. Gossen employed an abstract and psychological concept of utility (i.e., 
“want-satisfaction”), which is measurable and comparable across individuals (Howey, 
1973). In comparison, Austrian economics, which associates with the approaches of 
Menger, is generally perceived as pursuing deductive, a priori reasoning rather than 
empirical analysis or empiricism; whereas, neoclassical economics is generally associated 
with empiricism and its scientific method.  
Jörg Guido Hülsmann (2007), an economist of the Austrian school, explains that Carl 
Menger (2007) and his empiricism emphasized a search for means to explain why actual 
pricing processes in the liberal market defies economic theory. Menger (2007) undertook 
the task of showing that the properties and laws of economic phenomena result from 
empirically discoverable “elements of the human economy.” These elements comprise an 
individual’s human needs, knowledge, ownership, and further, quantities of goods, time, 
and individual error. Menger did identify these elements for analysis, while also 
undertaking to explain how these elements cause market phenomena such as prices. This 
was Menger’s empiricism, which he emphasized as having been the same method (i.e., 
empirical method) employed so well in the natural sciences.  
The distinction between economics, more particularly Austrian economics, and the 
natural sciences is important. This is because empiricism supposedly does not involve 
abstract postulates in forming hypotheses, which is a common practice when studying 
natural phenomena. The empiricist approach of the social sciences generally employs the 
systematic construct of a causal theory, which is a grounding of theory on observations of 
empirical phenomena, such as human needs, wants, knowledge, etc.   
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However, Menger, and his psychological approach, uses the concept of “value” as 
being the relative importance for an individual of the marginal unit of a good, such as 
“good X”. Relativity lies in an individual comparing “good X” to others, such as “good 
Y”, “good Z”, and on and on. The result is a market price reflecting an interaction 
between buyers and sellers. While Menger was justifying prices as being the result of 
comparing “good X” to other goods, conversely, there are other economists such as 
Gossen, William Stanley Jevons (1871) and his marginal utility theory of value, and Léon 
Walras (1874) offering different interpretations. 
When undertaking to understand the marginalist revolution, the viewpoints of Jevons, 
Walras, and Menger are important. This is because many consider them the founding 
fathers of the marginalist revolution and the neoclassical approach. As a courtesy of 
Antoine Augustin Cournot and his earlier functional relationships (i.e., demand function, 
partial equilibrium model, or Cournot competition) between quantities, and prices and 
costs, Walras (1838), had come under the influence of French rationalism and the new 
knowledge or tool of mathematics in economics, as he later became one of the leaders of 
the marginalist revolution (Theocharis, 1990; Morrison, 1998). Cournot (1838) as 
concerns issue of the competition of producers, actually, also provided an earlier variety 
of what later hails as the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950a: 48-49; Nash, 1950b: 155-162; 
Nash, 1953: 128-140) when addressing the case of a duopoly and employing a solution 
concept. 
What is important is that Gossen, Jevons, Walras, and other proponents of the theory 
of marginal utility or the marginalists, generally explain pricing as resulting from the 
impact of a marginal quality of a good on an individual; in others words, the psychology 
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of the actor (i.e., the individual, buyer or seller). These three proponents of marginalism 
variously describe the impact of a marginal, which is respectively by Gossen as “want-
satisfaction,” by Jevons as “utility,” and by Walras as “satisfied needs.” For example, 
Jevons (1862), when defining utility or the coefficient of utility, wrote, “This function of 
utility is peculiar to each kind of object, and more or less to each individual. Thus, the 
appetite for dry bread is much more rapidly satisfied than that for wine, for clothes, for 
handsome furniture, for works of art, or, finally, for money. And every one has his own 
peculiar tastes in which he is nearly insatiable.” 
A commonality between these economists is, actually, a resulting similar explanation 
of the pricing process in a liberal market. For instance, Menger’s theory and his marginal 
value produce structurally the same role that marginal utility plays in Jevon’s theory. 
There is also the commonality of their respective psychological approaches, as each of 
these theorists either explicitly or implicitly employed the human psyche as the common 
denominator of all economic value, thereby advancing the ability of economists to derive 
from the consumption of goods a mathematical function of these quantities 
(Hülsmann, :130-133). 
3. Ludwig von Mises and Marginalism 
Then there are the distinguishable observations of the Austrian economist Ludwig von 
Mises (1949) concerning the law of marginal utility. Herr von Mises (1949) challenged 
the psychological approach or the Psychological School. For von Mises, the external 
world of what he deems “action man” as one in which man must adjust his conduct is one 
of quantitative determinateness, where there exist quantitative relations between cause 
and effect. Otherwise, definite things could render unlimited services, which results in 
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things never becoming scarce, or capable of being subject to treatment as means. His 
hypothesized “acting man” values things as means to remove his uneasiness, which is 
distinguishable from the natural sciences and perception of events resulting in the 
satisfaction of human needs and wants.  
Acting man does not discern these difference, because, as being more or less the same 
thing for him, “In valuing very different states of satisfaction and the means for their 
attainment, man arranges all things in one scale and sees in them only their relevance for 
an increase in his own satisfaction” (Mises, 1949). As such, satisfactions derived from 
food, work or one’s job, art, etc., as concerning acting man’s judgment is “a more urgent 
or a less urgent need; valuation and action place them in one scale of what is more 
intensively desired and what is less.” For Mises’ acting man there exists only various 
degrees of relevance and urgency with regard to his own well-being. The concept of 
utility serves as the “causal relevance for the removal of felt uneasiness,” because, 
“Acting man believes the services a thing can render are apt to improve his own well-
being, and calls this the utility of the thing concerned” (Mises, 1949). 
A problem of old (classical) economics or earlier economists is that, “They observed 
that things whose ‘utility’ is greater are valued less than other things of smaller utility.” 
Mises illustrates this point by using the example of a greater appreciation for gold than 
iron, which he deems incompatible with the theory of value and prices as grounded on the 
concepts of utility and use-value. According to Mises, “The economists believed that they 
had to abandon such a theory and tried to explain the phenomena of value and market 
exchange by other theories.” Economists later discover “that the apparent paradox was 
the outcome of a vicious formulation of the problem involved. The valuations and 
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choices that result in the exchange ratios of the market do not decide between gold and 
iron. Acting man is not in a position in which he must choose between all the gold and 
all the iron” (Mises, 1949). 
There is no abstract problem of total utility or total value. There is no ratiocinative 
operation which could lead from the valuation of a definite quantity or number of 
things to the determination of the value of a greater or smaller quantity or number. 
There is no means of calculating the total value of a supply if only the values of 
its parts are known. There is no means of establishing the value of a part of a 
supply if only the value of the total supply is known. There are in the sphere of 
values and valuations no arithmetical operations; there is no such thing as a 
calculation of values…The concepts of total utility and total value are 
meaningless if not applied to a situation in which people must choose between 
total supplies. The question whether gold as such and iron as such is more useful 
and valuable is reasonable only with regard to a situation in which mankind or an 
isolated part of mankind must choose between all the gold and all the iron 
available (Mises, 1949). 
 
For von Mises (1949), economists did not need to employ the concept of 
“psychology” in description of these facts, nor resort to psychological reasoning when 
seeking to prove these facts. By claiming that the acts of choice are not contingent on 
value attached to a whole class of wants, but, instead, that attached to concrete wants in 
question regardless of the class, we fail to add anything to our field of knowledge and “do 
not trace it back to some better-known or more general knowledge.” This language of 
classes of wants only becomes intelligible after we remember the critical role-played in 
the history of economic thought by the alleged historical paradox of value.  
Mises (1949) observed that these earlier economists, such as Carl Menger in his  
Principles of Economics (Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 1871) and the Austrian 
economist Eugen Ritter von Böhm-Bawerk in his Capital and Interest: Positive Theory of 
Capital (Kapital und Kapitalzins: Positive Theorie des Kapitales, 1909), had to make use 
of the term “class of wants,” though now a superfluous concept, for purpose of refuting 
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the objections raised by those who “considered bread as such more valuable than silk 
because the class want of nourishment” is more important than the “class want of 
luxurious clothing.” Finally, the law of marginal utility and its attendant decreasing 
marginal value is independent of Gossen’s law of the saturation of wants, which is the 
first law of Gossen. Therefore, when addressing issues of treating marginal utility, we 
deal neither with sensuous enjoyment nor with saturation and satiety. This concept of 
classes is not in this world, as it is our mind classifying the phenomena for purpose of 
organizing our knowledge (Mises, 1949; Menger, 1909). 
Accordingly, von Mises perceived those mathematicians and economists who adopt 
Daniel Bernoulli’s mode of reasoning as unable to succeed in solving the paradox of 
value. He writes, “The mistakes inherent in the confusion of the Weber-Fechner law of 
psychophysics and the subjective theory of value have already been attacked by Max 
Weber.” In this respect, he is generally addressing the law describing the relationship 
between the physical magnitudes of stimuli and the intensity of the stimuli. This law, 
more accurately, posits, “that any change in our level of sense perception is closely and 
proportionally related to any change in the intensity of the stimuli that were just acting on 
the senses. The extent to which our eyes detect that the light in a room has gotten brighter, 
for instance, depends on and is proportional to the previous level of brightness”(Zafirovski, 
2001). This law is attributable to the German physician Ernst Heinrich Weber, who is the 
founder of experimental psychology, as what is known as Weber’s Law. Subsequently, 
this law known as Weber’s Law later evolves, which is due to further elaborations of 
Weber’s theory by the German experimental psychologist Gustav Theodor Fechner, 
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thereby becoming known as the Weber-Fechner Law or the fundamental law of 
psychophysics. 
However, both Alexius Meinong, in his About the importance of Weber’s law, 
contributions to the psychology of comparison and measurement (Über die Bedeutung 
des Weberschen Gesetzes: Beiträge zur Psychologie des Vergleichens und Messens, 1896) 
and Max Weber, in what is consider his magna opus Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden 
Soziologie, published posthumously 1922), were critical of the Weber-Fechner Law 
(Meinong, 1896; Weber, 1922; Weber, 1967).  
This is because the limitations of the Weber-Fechner Law are that verification 
routinely fails for very high and low intensities of sensation; notwithstanding the actual 
nature of sensations that we prepare, the power of discrimination may be subject to 
influence of many factors; the relation between intensity of a stimulus to that of an 
absolute intensity of sensation may not be contingent other conditions, but rather on the 
mere intensity of the stimulus itself; and one could assume this law to be perfectly exact, 
in regards that it states that unlikeliness between sensations depend on their respective 
relative differences, without supporting proposition that this relative difference is 
determined solely by difference of external stimulation.  
Moreover, Mises generally considered Max Weber as not sufficiently familiar with 
economics and too much under the influence of historicism to arrive at a correct insight 
into the fundamentals of economic thought, especially modern economic thought or 
neoclassical economy theory. Nonetheless, he still, though seemingly contradictory, 
senses in Weber an ingenious intuition that enables him to find a way toward the correct 
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solution. For instance, Max Weber (1922) observed that the theory of marginal utility is 
“not psychologically substantiated, but rather—if an epistemological term is to be 
applied—pragmatically, i.e., on the employment of the categories: ends and means.” 
(Bernoulli, 1922). Consequently, for Mises (1949), “The confusion of marginal utility 
and the Weber-Fechner Law originated from the mistake of looking only at the means for 
the attainment of satisfaction and not at the satisfaction itself.” 
Following the rise of marginalism and its marginal analysis, economics secured the 
means to explain the mechanisms guiding human behavior. The idea being that once we 
come to understand how values evolve into market prices that guide the market behavior 
of individuals, then we able to also understand how property is formed, thereby, as 
Walras explained, how humankind ultimately “determines and carries out the 
appropriation” (Sima, 2004). Carl Menger, as uniquely both an economist and jurist, 
played a key role in the rise of marginalism or the then new science of marginalist 
economics. Menger (1967) described the relationship between economics and the law as 
follows.  
Thus human economy and property have a joint economic origin since 
both have, as the ultimate reason for their existence, the fact that goods 
exist whose available quantities are smaller than the requirements of men. 
Property, therefore, like human economy, is not an arbitrary invention but 
rather the only practically possible solution of the problem that is, in the 
nature of things, imposed upon us by the disparity between requirements 
for, and available quantities of, all economic goods. 
 
Because of such statements, and his training in both the science of law and science of 
economics, most recognize Menger as an earlier leader in both the marginalist revolution 
or the new science of marginal economics, and the new science of law. Following his 
earlier influence is the establishment of Menger’s new Austrian school and its general 
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theory of human action, which is a praxeology that experiences further development, 
though later, by Ludwig von Mises.  
A key to the understanding the significance of both this new school of economics—
Austrian school and this new science of economics—marginalist economics, or simply, 
the Mengerian-Misesian tradition, is ultimately a sufficiently wide girth in analysis that 
allows the science of economics to include “the analyses of legal processes as an integral 
part of its study” (Sima, 2004). Although for years, the Mengerian-Misesian tradition 
hails as the mainstream approach in economics, during the Second World War, its 
influence wanes when the science of economics shifts to a more technical analysis, which 
was mostly due to the Austrian school being too social science oriented, rather than more 
narrow and technical economics oriented. However, during the post-Second World War 
period, this “formalized, propertyless economics” became increasingly irrelevant to the 
real world (Sima, 2004).  
An important shift in the focus of economic analysis subsequently occurs with the 
new economics schools, such as Chicago Law and Economics, New Institutional 
Economics, and Public Choice Theory, commencing to integrate, though contra post-
World War Two conventional praxeology, social dimensions into the science of 
economics, or simply, the new schools regenerated the link between law and economics. 
This is the relationship between law (i.e., property) and economics earlier envisaged by 
Carl Menger. There is also Ludwig von Mises, in his Liberalism (1927), who gives 
definitional meaning to law by explaining why a property based social system is “the 
only workable system of human cooperation in a society based on the division of labor.”  
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There is also the viewpoint of the earlier German Historical School of economics 
(Die Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie) and its German historicism. One source 
described German historicism as “unabashedly inductive in its approach.” This is because 
many deem German historicism as reducing all economic generalizations, or perhaps 
more accurately, the reduction of abstractions to relative judgments. A direct 
consequence of the latter is German historicism then advancing an argument that each 
economic problem must be undertaken “de novo” (Latin: Anew; A second time; afresh). 
By doing so, the German Historical School of economics effectually stood in 
contravention of the idea of an expert in the field, though employing an array of 
economic tools such as the principles of deduction, being unable to address problems in 
economics as a singular authority.  
In the history of economic thought, the earlier German Historical School of 
economics, though by the 1880s following a Methodenstreit (German: literally, “strife 
over methods”) that eventually resulted in an acceptance of neoclassical theory and 
marginal analysis, earlier rejects both classical economic theory and the then new 
intellectual fashion of marginal analysis. The rejection of these two schools of economic 
thought was due to their viewpoint that the approaches of both the classicists and 
marginalists “abstracted timeless economics laws from specific historical settings and 
from the social and political context of economic activity” (Ringer, 1979; Ringer, 1969). 
The progressing economic history from the classicists, to neoclassicists, and especially 
the German “Historical School of economics” and its German historicism, serves as a 
reminder of the progression from Newtonian methods, to then later Enlightenment 
economics. (Bernsterin, 2004). 
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4. The Realty of Strategic Theory 
In the real reality of modern society, theorists, scholars, and practitioners, generally apply 
the tools of this new knowledge to real life interactions, situations or experiences, which 
widely range, though not an exhaustive listing, from social, economics, politics, and even 
international diplomacy situations. In this respect, game theory similarly, as often 
reflecting characteristics similar to real life interactions or situations, especially 
competitive or cooperative situations, is able to suggest strategies for addressing real life 
interactions, situations or experiences. Game theory based on the strategy of players in 
particular games will often involve suggestions such as predictions of how people 
(individual or entities), political factions, or even states will behave in given situations.  
A classic example of an interaction based on real life interactions is the famous 
prisoner’s’ dilemma and its illustration of the problematic and unproductive zero-sum 
game or situation. The primary purpose of game theory is to consider situations or 
experiences where instead of agents making decisions as reactions to situations or 
experiences,  such as exogenous prices (i.e., “dead variables”), their decisions are 
strategic reactions to other agents’ actions (i.e., “live variables”). An agent is faced with a 
set of moves he can play and will form a strategy, a best response to his environment, 
which he will play (by). When employing game theory to these situations or experiences, 
strategies can be either “pure” (i.e., play a particular move) or “mixed” (i.e., random 
play).  
The purpose, essentially, is to consider situations or experiences where agents make 
decisions that are strategic reactions to other agents’ actions (i.e., live variables). This is 
instead of than making decisions as reactions to exogenous factors (i.e., dead variables). 
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AS a result, “An agent is faced with a set of moves he can play and will form a strategy, a 
best response to his environment, which he will play by. Strategies can be either “pure” 
(i.e., play a particular move) or “mixed” (i.e., random play).” What is referred to as the 
classical Nash equilibrium will be “reached when each agent’s actions begets a reaction 
by all the other agents which, in turn, begets the same initial action.” In other words, the 
best responses of all players are in accordance with each other. 
As previously mentioned, the problem inherent in the zero-sum situation is 
extendable to many real life situations or experiences, including various fields of studies, 
disciplines or sciences, and a wide variety of other situations or experiences.  A classic 
illustration of the wide birth of the applicability of game theory to situation and 
experiences is the post-World War II uncontrolled arms race and deterrence theory 
(Schelling, 1960). What occurs in the game theory of non-zero sum game, which is 
primarily attributable to failings that associate with non-cooperation, is generally 
assumed Nash equilibrium or non-cooperative equilibria. This is a theory earlier 
developed by the mathematician and 1994 Nobel laureate John Forbes Nash, Jr. In 1950, 
during a lecture at Stanford University, the mathematician Albert W. Tucker, actually, 
created the prisoners’ dilemma for illustrating the difficulty of analyzing particular games 
(Nash, 1950a: 48-49; Nash, 1950b: 155-162; Nash, 1953: 128-140; McCain, 2003).  
5. Conclusion 
The achievement of Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) also predates both Tucker’s 
model of the prisoners’ dilemma. Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and ultimately, laid 
the groundwork for the introduction of an interdisciplinary research field of game theory 
or the strategic game. More importantly, there are the earlier works of many others, 
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including Neumann (1928) and his Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele (On the Theory of 
Parlor Games), which also predate the 1944 work of Neumann and Morgenstern. The 
earlier contribution of von Neumann (1928) was his thesis or proof of the minimax 
theorem, which states that all two-person zero-sum games with finitely pure strategies for 
each player is determined (i.e., with mixed strategies admitted), presents a variety of a 
game producing one individual-rational payoff vector. His thesis (Neumann, 1929) 
necessitated an involved use of both topology and functional calculus; ultimately, 
presenting a thesis that also introduces an extensive form of a game.  
As Robert Cooter (1995) observed, when he was discussing how economic models of 
rational behavior have affected all fields of the social sciences, such as history, 
philosophy, and law, “In strategic games, each player forms his or her strategy on the 
assumption that other players form their strategies by anticipating what he or she will 
do.” For game theorists, the usefulness of game theory or the strategic game is mostly 
attributable to the fact of its potential to generate new ideas. This is because, “having 
ideas is the scientist’s highest accomplishment” (Lyotard, 1984: 60). Moreover, the 
scientific achievement of game theory or the strategic game enjoys an association with 
corresponding accomplishments in the earlier history and development of economic 
thought. 
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